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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING AGENDA

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Tuesday, February 5, 1985

Cabinet Room

11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon

VISIT OF KING FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA

Agenda

- |       |                                      |  |
|-------|--------------------------------------|--|
| I.    | Introduction                         | Robert C. McFarlane<br>(3 minutes)                     |
| II.   | Political and Diplomatic<br>Overview | Secretary Shultz<br>(10 minutes)                       |
| III.  | Intelligence Assessment              | Director Casey<br>(5 minutes)                          |
| IV.   | Defense Cooperation                  | Secretary Weinberger/<br>General Vessey<br>(5 minutes) |
| V.    | Trade Relations                      | Secretary Baldrige/<br>Ambassador Brock<br>(5 minutes) |
| VI.   | International Oil Situation          | Secretary Hodel<br>(5 minutes)                         |
| VII.  | Discussion                           | All Participants<br>(25 minutes)                       |
| VIII. | Summary                              | Robert C. McFarlane<br>(2 minutes)                     |

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, JO, SA, US, OVIP  
SUBJECT: FAHD VISIT: THE PEACE PROCESS AND SUPPORT  
- FOR MODERATE ARABS

REF: (A) AMMAN 198 (NOTAL), (B) RIYADH 321 (NOTAL)

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2. KING FAHD'S UPCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THE SAUDIS AND OURSELVES CLOSER TOGETHER ON TWO REGIONAL ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN--REVIVING THE PEACE PROCESS AND STRENGTHENING MODERATE ARAB REGIMES.

3. ON THE PEACE PROCESS KING HUSSEIN HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF BOLD STEPS DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS TO IMPROVE THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE ARABS, FOCUSING SPECIFICALLY ON CRAFTING AN ARAB APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HIS RESTORATION OF RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND HIS CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE MODERATE ARAB LEADERSHIP IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF ARE ALL INTENDED TO CREATE BROAD ARAB BACKING FOR JORDAN'S AND EGYPT'S APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ISOLATE THE RADICALS WHO OPPOSE IT. HUSSEIN'S ACTIVE ARAB DIPLOMACY IS ALSO INTENDED TO CAUSE THE PLO TO FEAR THAT IT MAY LOSE ITS BASES OF SUPPORT AMONG THE MODERATE ARABS IF IT REJECTS HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE. HIS AMBITIOUS GOALS ARE TO COOPT THE PLO AND TO CHALLENGE U.S. AND ISRAELI CAUTION WITH A NEW ARAB POSITION THAT OFFERS A NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. AT THIS POINT HUSSEIN'S CHANCES FOR SUCCESS WITH THE PLO ARE LESS THAN 50/50, BUT THE ODDS WOULD IMPROVE IF THE MODERATE ARABS, PARTICULARLY THE SAUDIS, WOULD BACK HUSSEIN'S EFFORT MORE FORCEFULLY.

4. IN MAKING THESE MOVES HUSSEIN INCURS CONSIDERABLE RISKS BOTH TO HIS PERSON AND HIS COUNTRY. THE SYRIANS, IRANIAN OPERATIVES, AND DISSIDENT PALESTINIANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERTAKE VIOLENT ACTIONS DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE JORDAN AND THE KING'S INITIATIVES.

5. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, SAUDI SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. DURING KING

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FAHD'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WE HOPE THE PRESIDENT WILL REITERATE OUR OWN SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS AND ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO BE EVEN SUPPORTIVE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN THUS FAR.

6. DIPLOMATICALLY THE SAUDIS IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER ARAB LEADERS CAN ENHANCE THE KING'S POSITION BY STATING NOT JUST THAT THEY CAN SUPPORT WHATEVER THE KING AND THE PLO WORK OUT, BUT RATHER THAT THEY SUPPORT HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE AND BELIEVE THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY. WITH THE PLO THE SAUDIS SHOULD BE STRONGER, MAKING CLEAR THAT THE PLO FACES NO REALISTIC HOPE OF RESOLVING THE OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA UNLESS IT THROWS ITS LOT WITH HUSSEIN. SUCH A MESSAGE WILL BE READ CLEARLY BY THE PALESTINIANS AS A SAUDI RETREAT FROM THEIR SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE (ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT ENTAIL, NOR CAN WE EXPECT, THE SAUDIS TO DECLARE THAT DIRECTLY). SUCH A CLEAR SAUDI POSITION ON THE PLO'S NEED TO ACCEPT THE KING'S INITIATIVE WOULD STRENGTHEN THOSE WITHIN THE PLO WHO WANT TO SEE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION THROUGH COOPERATION WITH KING HUSSEIN. WITH THE GULF STATES AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IT COULD WELL LEAD TO MORE PUBLIC AND VOCAL SUPPORT FOR THE KING AND, IN DOING SO, STRENGTHEN HIS ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN THE FACE OF EXISTING THREATS.

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7. WITH THE SYRIANS THE SAUDIS COULD HELP HUSSEIN GREATLY BY PASSING A MESSAGE THAT THEIR

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CHECKS WILL NOT ARRIVE ON TIME IF SYRIA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM IN JORDAN. UNLESS THE SYRIANS FEEL SOME REAL PRESSURE FROM THEIR ARAB BANKERS, DAMASCUS' ADDICTION TO PURSUIT OF ITS REGIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH TERROR WILL GROW AS SYRIA'S DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION DEEPENS. THE PENINSULA WILL AT SOME POINT NOT BE IMMUNE.

8. THE POSSIBLE SAUDI EFFORTS MENTIONED ABOVE, WHICH SERVE TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES FOR PROGRESS IN THE PEACE PROCESS, ALSO ADDRESS A SECOND INTEREST OF MUTUAL CONCERN TO BOTH THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA: SUPPORT FOR MODERATE ARAB REGIMES INCLUDING HUSSEIN. SAUDI ARABIA HAS LONG RECOGNIZED ITS OWN INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THE MODERATE ROLE OF KING HUSSEIN ALONG ITS NORTHERN BORDERS. RECOGNIZING THIS INTEREST IS ALSO OURS, WE RECOMMEND THE PRESIDENT RAISE JORDAN'S INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FINANCIAL SITUATION WITH KING FAHD AND RELATE THAT SITUATION TO JORDAN'S NEED TO MODERNIZE ITS MILITARY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IT REMAINS VERY MUCH IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT THE JORDANIAN MILITARY REMAIN CLOSE TO THE WEST AND NOT MOVE TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE IT FINDS THE SOVIET UNION THE ONLY AFFORDABLE SOURCE. (THE SYRIAN THREAT IS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND JORDAN'S QUEST FOR MODERNIZATION, BUT THIS ASPECT WILL PLAY LESS WELL WITH FAHD THAN THE SOVIET DIMENSION.) THE PRESIDENT WILL REPORT THAT WE ARE REVIEWING OUR OWN POLICY ON THE SUBJECT OF ARMS FOR MODERATE ARAB REGIMES AND THAT OUR DECISIONS ARE STILL TO BE MADE, BUT HE CAN USEFULLY FLAG THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN'S FINANCIAL NEED FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE SAUDIS AT A LATER DATE.

9. IN SUMMARY, THE SAUDIS NEED TO HEAR FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF OUR GOVERNMENT OUR SUPPORT

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FOR KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS TO FIND A PATH  
TOWARD PEACE. IN STRESSING OUR SUPPORT FOR  
MODERATE ARAB REGIMES THE SAUDIS SHOULD KNOW  
WE ARE CONSIDERING THE ARMS QUESTION AS WELL  
AND WE MAY BE ASKING THEM TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL  
SUPPORT AT SOME FUTURE POINT. THE TIMING OF  
FAHD'S VISIT IN RELATION TO OUR OWN POLICY  
REVIEW IS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD, BUT PAST  
EXPERIENCE PROVES THAT IF THESE POINTS ARE  
NOT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE MEETS WITH  
THE SAUDI KING, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE  
CONSIDERED AS RELATIVELY LESS IMPORTANT  
CONCERNS WHEN RAISED SUBSEQUENTLY AT LOWER  
LEVELS. THUS THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH  
KING FAHD IS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT  
OUR CONCEPT OF THE MUTUAL INTERESTS WE WILL  
PURSUE IN DETAIL OVER COMING MONTHS AND YEARS.

BOEKER

END OF MESSAGE

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